

APR 1953

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FOREIGN SERVICE DESPATCH

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FROM : AmEmbassy, VIENNA

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DESP. NO.

TO : THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON.

October 30, 1953
DATE

REF :

42 For Dept. Use Only	ACTION EUR. 5	DEPT. IN DC/R 2 OLI-6 UNA 4 P-1 GER. 4 S/S-2 G-1 S/P-1
	REC'D 11/9	OTHER O CIA-7 ARMY-3 NAVY-3 AIR-3 OCB-1 Moscow-1

SUBJECT: CONVERSATION WITH MR. A. M. TIMOSHCHENKO, COUNSELOR OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY

During a British reception yesterday, Mr. Timoshchenko sought me out in a rather pointed fashion, apparently for the purpose of making the remarks which follow:

He enquired whether the American Embassy would be represented at the Special Session of Parliament the next day at which the Chancellor was to deliver a speech on the 10th anniversary of the Moscow Declaration. I replied that I doubted that we would, suggesting that Mr. Raab might have some unpleasant remarks to make about all four occupying powers in view of our failure to conclude an Austrian treaty for so long a time. Mr. Timoshchenko declared that an Austrian treaty is in fact overdue, but that what is needed primarily in the world today is the restoration of confidence and mutual understanding between the Soviet Union and the United States.

He referred to the loss of ten million lives in Russia during the last war and to the strenuous efforts now being made to raise the standard of living in the Soviet Union as reasons for his Government's determination to avoid a new war. He said that the Soviet Union would of course not attempt to overthrow the capitalist system in the United States, and he assumes that we would not attempt to overthrow the Communist system in Russia. This being the case, there is no reason why we should not live together peacefully. The Russian people, however, are deeply alarmed by the rearmament of Western Germany and the Western bases which are being created in the neighborhood of the Soviet Union, both of which they felt to be a serious threat to Soviet security and certain to lead to war in five or six years if they continue.

In reply I referred to the thorough-going fashion in which the US had disarmed directly after World War II and to the fact that our recent rearmament and that of our allies was a defensive reaction against threats to our security. When he remarked that the United States is too far away to be seriously threatened, I

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pointed out that in the present stage of air warfare no nation can feel wholly secure. Returning to his reference to the Germans, I suggested that if they were knit firmly into a European community they would be unable, even if they should so desire, to return to their former aggressive practices. Timoshchenko replied that Germany is basically so strong that she would drag any European community along at her heels and that the only solution would be for her to be neutralized. When I remarked that it would hardly be realistic to think of isolating such a country as Germany, in the center of Europe, without ties or associations of any kind, he replied that she might have economic and cultural ties.

When he reverted to his basic theme of the importance of the US and USSR understanding each other, I suggested that an invitation to Lugano is outstanding and that to accept this invitation would be an excellent way to make a beginning. He said he feared the meeting in Lugano would develop merely into an argument about the agenda; what he thought was needed was a high-level meeting with a broader scope. When I enquired what he felt to be the most important problems that such a meeting might deal with, he replied that the first problem would be to arrange for the entry of Communist China into the U.N. He said that he could understand that we might wish to keep a base in Formosa, but that it was unrealistic to try to keep out of international councils a government representing 400,000,000 people. I said that I failed to see how the admission of Communist China into the U.N. would help the world to feel any more secure or would relieve the international tensions we had been discussing, but that more substantive action would be required to achieve these aims. He replied that this of course would be only the beginning and that the vital point was that the US and USSR must understand each other and make the most serious efforts to arrange their differences.

He appeared prepared to expand on this theme indefinitely, but at that point we were interrupted.

COMMENT: The above conversation is reported at some length largely because Timoshchenko has for some time been known to be the most fanatical, the most uncompromising, and the most anti-American of the officials in the Soviet Embassy with whom Americans have contact. The fact that he should make such a point of the necessity of Soviet/American understanding, even though entirely on Soviet terms, would seem to suggest that this is a line which he has been instructed to propagate.

FOR THE HIGH COMMISSIONER:

Charles W. Yost

Deputy High Commissioner

Department: Please send cc to

AmEmbassy, MOSCOW

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~~APPROACH IN KABUL~~

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1/. In past month (November) [REDACTED] has received 4 invitations, all verbal, to dine at the homes of the Soviet Military Mission. Three invitations have come from Col. SEMENOV, Military Attache of Sov Emb Kabul. The most recent invitation came from Lt. Col. PODPORIN, Ass't Mil Attache. [REDACTED] accepted and will dine w/one or both as soon as arrangements can be made.

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